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Jan Woleński 
 
Abstract. This papers discuss the place, if any, of Convention T (the condition of 
material adequacy of the proper definition of truth formulated by Tarski) in the truth-makers 
account offered by Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons and Barry Smith. It is argued that although 
Tarski’s requirement seems entirely acceptable in the frameworks of truth-makers theories for 
the first-sight, several doubts arise under a closer inspection. In particular, T-biconditionals 
have no clear meaning as sentences about truth-makers. Thus, truth-makers theory cannot be 
considered as the semantic theory of truth enriched by metaphysical (ontological) data. The 
problem of truth-makers for sentences about future events is discussed at the end of the paper.    
 
Since Convention T is a very important ingredient of the semantic theory of truth, 
every comparison of Tarski’s construction with other approaches to the concept of truth must, 
sooner or later, discuss the equivalence:   
(1) S is true if and only if A*, 
where A is a sentence in an interpreted (this qualification is important, because is dispenses us 
with worries whether propositions or sentences function as bearers of truth) language L, S is a 
name of this sentence and the symbol A* refers to embedding, for example via translation, of 
A into a metalanguage ML. Convention T requires that any materially correct truth-definition  
Df logically entail every instance of (1), that is, the specialization of this scheme for an 
arbitrary sentence of L; such concrete equivalences are called T–sentences, T–biconditionals 
or T–equivalences. According to Tarski, (1) does not constitute a truth-definition, although it 
can be considered as a partial one. Take the content of the sentence A as the set of all its 
consequences, formally Cont(A) = Cn({A}). Clearly, Cont(Df) >  B, if B is an instance of (1). 
In fact, the content of Df exceeds the collection (rather rather the content) of all instantiations 
of (1), because truth-definitions usually contain elements (expressions) which do not occur in 
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T–sentences, for instance terms borrowed from set theory, like ‘the empty set’ or ‘sequence’ 
as in the case of the semantic definition of truth. Another argument that (1) cannot serve as an 
adequate  truth-definition is that it holds for falsehoods as well. 
Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons and Barry Smith (MSS for brevity) claim in their 
seminal  important paper (see Mulligan, Simons, Smith 1984, p. 10/11; page-reference to 
2007 reprint) as follows: 
Putnam […] has argued that Tarski’s theory of truth, through its very innocuousness, its eschewal of 
‘undesirable’ notions, fails to determine the concept it was intended to capture, since the formal characterization 
still fits if we reinterpret ‘true’ to mean, for instance, ‘warrantedly assertable’ and adjust our interpretation of the 
logical constants accordingly. Putnam’s conclusion […] is that if we want to account for truth, Tarski’s work 
needs supplementing with a philosophically non-neutral correspondence theory. If we are right that the Tarskian 
account neglects precisely the atomic sentences, then its indeterminacy is not surprising. […]. If as we suggest, 
the nature of truth is underdetermined by theories like that of Tarski, then an adequate account of truth must 
include considerations  which are other than purely semantic in the normally accepted sense. Our suggestion here 
– a suggestion which is formulated in a realist spirit – is that the way to such a theory lies through direct 
examination of the link between truth-bearers, the material of logic, and truth-makers, that in the world in virtue 
of which sentences or propositions are true. 
Although MSS modestly call their proposal a mere suggestion, the actual task of introducing 
the concept of truth-makers seems to be  much more ambitious, namely offering at least an 
outline of a full-blooded theory of truth, in particular, metaphysically grounded. In fact, their 
paper inaugurated a considerable and hot discussion (see Armstrong 2004, and the papers in 
Beebee and Dodd 2005, Monnoyer 2007, Loewe and Rami 2009).     
Disregarding the details of Putnam criticism of Tarski (however, see Woleński 2001 
for a defense of the semantic definition of truth against Putnam’s arguments), I will 
investigate how MSS’s account of truth is related to that of Tarski. More precisely, I will 
discuss  an application, if any, of Convention T when truth-makers are used in an explanation 
of the concept of truth. Two interpretations of the quoted passage are possible. Firstly, the 
concept of truth-maker supplements the vocabulary of Tarski’s theory. Such a reading seems 
to assume that although Tarski’s account correctly captures very general properties of truth, it 
requires additional conceptual resources in order for the indeterminacy noted by MSS to 
disappear. If so, Convention T should be fully preserved. Secondly, introducing truth-makers 
as a notional device leads to a different truth-definition which partially or even entirely is at 
odds with the semantic account. In this case, however, Convention T can be rejected, 
modified or preserved in its full form. Each of  these three  possibilities should be excluded in 
advance; Tarski himself did not claim that his definition of truth satisfies only the requirement 
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of material adequacy established by Convention T. MSS’s literal formulations tend to be 
closer to the first option, because they explicitly postulate  supplementing the typical semantic 
machinery by ‘a philosophically non-neutral correspondence theory’ in order to achieve a 
determination of truth-theory. This could suggest that formal semantics cum metaphysics 
(realist in the version of MSS) represented by the concept of truth-makers provides a fully 
determinate, that is, ontologically involved,  theory of truth. Yet, and this circumstance 
suggests the second interpretation as also possible, MSS characterize ‘an adequate account of 
truth’ as a philosophical construction that  ‘must include  considerations […] other than 
semantic in the normally accepted sense’. The meaning of the context ‘considerations which 
are other than purely semantic in the normally accepted sense’ can be understood as referring 
to the theory radically opposed to that offered by Tarski. I will argue that MSS offer a theory 
which cannot be regarded as the semantic account of truth supplemented by a certain  amount 
of metaphysics.    
Alfred Rami (see Rami 2009, p. 3) proposed the following general  characterization of  
truth-makers theories (I deliberately disregard all appeals to the truth-making relation as a 
necessary connection). All assume the so-called truth-maker principle in the following form 
(2) For every x, x is true if and only if there is a y such that y is a  truth maker for x. 
This statement implies: 
(3) For every x, x is true, then x has a truth-maker;  
(4) For every x, if x has a truth-maker, then x is true.  
Implication (2) expresses truth-maker maximalism, but (4) is the principle of truth-maker 
purism. If we combine (3) and (4), we obtain 
(5) For every x, x is true if and only if x has a truth-maker,  
which is a more convenient formulation of (2), at least for my considerations in this paper. In 
order to neutralize semantic antinomies, (5) should be rewritten as the scheme: 
(6) S is true if and only if a sentence named by S has a truth-maker. 
This equivalence can be regarded as generating formulas very close to T–sentences. Perhaps 
we can introduce the name ‘TM–biconditionals’ as a label for instances of (6). Consider the 
sentence (i) ‘snow is white”. Assume that English supplemented by a simple mathematical 
notation serves as a metalanguage. The related T-equivalence for the sentence in question can 
be written as 
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(7) The sentence ‘snow is white’ is true if and only if snow ∈  WHITE, 
where the word WHITE refers to the set of white entities. The right side of (7) translates the 
sentence (i) into the chosen metalanguage; this is the language of very elementary algebra of 
classes supplemented by logical constants  and syntactic devices allowing us to form names of 
sentences belonging to the object language). This translation can even be interpreted as 
pointing out a truth-maker for the sentence in question. Thus, the affinity between T–
equivalences and TM–biconditionals is striking (see Smith and Simon 2007 , p. 80-81 for an 
opposite view).    
Rami observes then that a truth-maker theory does not need to accept both statements 
(3) and (4). Speaking more precisely, he argues that it is fairly possible to accept truth-maker 
purism without being committed to truth-maker maximalism. On the other hand, Rami 
qualifies (4) as an analytic truth. His argument makes use reductio ad absurdum. Assume that 
A has a truth-maker, but it is untrue. If A has a truth-maker tm, it is true in its virtue. 
However, by assumption A is not true. Thus, A is true and untrue, which is impossible. In fact, 
MSS reject (3) in its full generality (see also Mulligan 2007, Smith and Simon 2007) and 
replace it by a restricted principle 
(8) A├ ∃tm(tm╟ A), 
which can be read ‘that A is true entails that there is a truth-maker tm making A true’. The 
principle (4) has the form: 
(9) tm╟ A ├ A,   
and its meaning is captured by the statement ‘what is made true, is true’. Although (8) and (9) 
implicitly use (1), this fact is not essential, because one can replace A by ‘A is true’ or ‘it is 
true that A’ without making any appeal to T–biconditionals.  
If someone accepts the maximalist truth-maker theory as David Armstrong does (see 
Armstrong 2004), that is, with (3), introducing a surrogate of Convention T creates no major 
problem (note that Armstrong does not make this step). Let the symbol TMT refer to such a 
truth-maker theory. We can claim that TMT is materially adequate if and only if it entails 
every instance of (2) or (6), that is, a TM–biconditional for any sentence. The issue looks 
differently in the case of the MSS account. Denote their theory by TMT’. First of all, (8) 
restricts the set of TM–equivalences to atomic sentences and some other cases, for instance, 
conjunctions of sentences which are simultaneously made  true by the same objects as truth-
makers. The restricted TM-scheme is expressed by 
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(10) A (is true) ⇔ ∃tm(tm╟ A). 
Unfortunately, we have no simple way to formulate a counterpart of Convention T for TMT’. 
The problem is that the limitations of (1) are extralogical in character and depend on a tension 
between the truth-functional (extensional) and the mereological character of truth–makers. 
Hence, the scope of the existential quantifier in (10) is not precisely established in advance. 
The situation is even much worse, because we do not know which elements of TMT’ imply 
the correct TM–equivalences. Perhaps this situation motivated Barry Smith  and Jonathan 
Simon (see Smith and Simon 2000, p. 97) to their diagnosis that we should not define truth 
via truth-makers, because this task is simply unrealizable. Although TMT’ justifies some, 
mostly very simple or elementary, T–conditionnals, no generally formulated condition of its 
material adequacy, similar to Convention T is available. Hence, TMT’ cannot be regarded as 
a metaphysically improved semantic theory of truth. It should be considered as an alternative 
to Tarski’s account.  
Finally, I would like to make some remarks about the status of (3) and (4). There is a 
simple argument that the latter is analytic or even a theorem of (meta)logic, but the former is 
not. In order to make the argument easier, let me rewrite both formulas as  
(11) TA ⇒  A; 
(12) A ⇒  TA.  
Formula (11) (see for example Turner 1990) is frequently adopted as one of the axioms of  the 
logic of truth, when truth operates as a modality, but (12) is either rejected for its role in 
generating the Liar paradox or suitably modified as in (1). However, another motivation for 
rejecting (12) as universally valid can be given. This motivation is completely independent of 
the problem of semantic antinomies. Suppose that a three-valued logic, for example 
Łukasiewicz’s logic , functions as the basic system. Take a valuation v such that v(A) = ½ . 
Clearly, the metalogical statement ‘v(A) = ½’ is true, but TA is false. This observation shows 
that the implication A ⇒  TA cannot be considered as a theorem of metalogic, although the 
formula TA ⇒  A still holds in many-valued logic and its metatheory. We have here a simple 
analogy with alethic modal logic. The operator T behaves quite analogously to the operator    
expressing the concept of necessity. Any modal logic admits the formula   A ⇒  A and rejects 
the formula A ⇒   A as a logical truth. If we accept the implication TA ⇒  A as tautological, 
but reject the reverse conditional A ⇒  TA as logically valid, the formula TA ⇔ A shares the 
fate of the latter and cannot be considered as a logical theorem. 
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Nevertheless, we have a way to justify the biconditional TA ⇔ A.  Suppose that we  
we accept the equivalence 
(13)  FA  ⇔ ¬TA ⇔ T¬A,  
which postulates that the falsity, non-truth of A and the truth of not-A are equipollent, (12) 
becomes acceptable. Otherwise speaking, introducing bivalence legitimizes the full T–scheme 
as a good  theorem of metalogic, provided that devices blocking semantic paradoxes are  
blocked. Thus, the principle of bivalence is a very important ingredient of the semantic theory 
of truth. It is quite unclear how TM’ is related to bivalence and whether if a many-valued 
logic were analyzed by the conceptual machinery of truth-makers, the intermediate logical 
values would have their own makers or not; the same question concerns falsity-makers (see 
Armstrong 2004 for a discussion of falsity-makers). Consider the sentence (ii) ‘Tomorrow 
there will be a sea battle’. Certainly, (ii) has no truth-maker at the present moment, but it will 
or will not have one tomorrow. Some authors (see Nef 2007) propose abstract truth-makers, 
but this way out seems to be very expensive (too expensive in my opinion) from the 
metaphysical point of view; the same concerns Josh Parsons’s (see Parsons 2005) ideas 
connecting truth-makers for statements about past and future events with the realism/anti-
realism controversy. If we are not radical indeterminists, assertions about the future can have 
something like possibility-makers before they become realized or not. Even without 
introducing many-valued logic, the assertion ‘(ii) has a possibility-maker’ is true, but the 
statement ‘(ii) has a truth-maker’ is false. I guess that TMT’ or any other non-maximalist 
truth-maker theory must be supplemented in order to be able to cope with statements about  
future. No  metaphysically grounded theory of truth can ignore this issue, although purely 
semantic (model-theoretic) constructions do not need discuss this question. I am inclined to 
think, unlike MSS and most authors dealing with truth-makers, that semantics should be seen 
as  autonomous in principle with respect to ontology or metaphysics. As a corollary we have 
that the semantic definition of truth as such does not require any metaphysical or ontological 
enrichment. Thus, Convention T suffices as the condition of material adequacy as far as the 
issue concerns the very general properties of truth.  On the other hand, nothing prevents 
making syntheses, realist or not, of semantics and ontology. Truth-makers theories go in this 
direction.                
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